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Problems and Recommendations 
When Germany Sends Troops Abroad: 
The case for a limited reform of the 
Parliamentary Participation Act 
Since the Parliamentary Participation Act came into 
force in 2005, the German Bundestag has given its 
assent to more than 70 requests of the Federal Govern-
ment for the deployment of German troops abroad, or 
the extension of such mandates, and has not rejected 
a single application. Urgent requests were decided 
within a few days. German armed forces – with the 
support of the Bundestag – have been deployed for 
years to many trouble spots around the world: Af-
ghanistan, Kosovo, the waters of the Mediterranean 
and the Horn of Africa. Although historical and other 
reasons mean that both public opinion and Parlia-
ment are sceptical of the use of military force, Ger-
many does not, as a rule, shirk its multilateral obli-
gations within NATO and the EU. 
Nevertheless, recent decisions of the Federal Gov-
ernment have been subject to criticism within the 
Alliance. This was particularly so in the case of the 
withdrawal of German military personnel from 
the multinational crews of reconnaissance aircraft 
(AWACS) operating over Afghanistan at the beginning 
of 2011 and their withdrawal, once again, from 
AWACS in the NATO-led operation in Libya in the 
spring of 2011. For Germany’s partners, participation 
with military personnel in the NATO Command 
Structure and in the Airborne Early Warning Com-
mand is a logical consequence of their membership 
of the Alliance, and so is not called into question 
during deployment. This is not the case in Germany, 
where participation during deployment has become 
the subject of fine-spun legal argument and heated 
political debate. Within the Alliance, the German 
position is perceived as being contradictory, lacking 
in solidarity, and not compatible with the nation’s 
significant position. This creates a political predica-
ment for Germany. In the EU context, it is only 
because military structures are less highly developed 
and the primary focus is on civilian crisis manage-
ment, that these difficulties are less acute. 
In spite of the apparent friction here, it is never-
theless clear that domestic democratic accountability 
and external alliance solidarity should go hand in 
hand: they form the dual imperative of German 
security policy. Making the deployment of German 
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armed forces abroad contingent on the constitutive 
consent of the Bundestag reflects a fundamental 
political choice. The deployment of German armed 
forces should not be left in the hands of the govern-
ment alone, but rather be the subject of detailed 
examination and a deliberate choice taken by the 
representatives of the German people, and thus carry 
the endorsement of the democratic process. Equally, 
Germany has decided, as a matter of principle, to 
employ its armed forces only within the framework 
of the United Nations, NATO or the EU. This can be 
explained by the country’s historical experience and 
its security needs as a mid-sized power at the centre 
of Europe. It is a fundamental German concern that 
North America be anchored to Europe by multilateral 
security policy and, further, that both Europe and 
Germany’s own capacity for political action be 
strengthened. From a German point of view, the un-
appealing alternatives would be a widening trans-
atlantic gap and ad hoc coalitions of the willing – on 
which the ‘unwilling’ can bring little influence to 
bear. 
A closely circumscribed amendment of the Parlia-
mentary Participation Act would underline Germany’s 
willingness to demonstrate Alliance solidarity without 
weakening the democratic legitimacy of its ‘parlia-
mentary army’. The changes would centre on two 
NATO capabilities that are crucial to the functioning 
and operating capacity of the organisation. Firstly, 
the established practice of German participation in 
all Headquarters of the integrated NATO Command 
Structure should anticipate the actual transition of 
the Command Structure towards greater flexibility 
and thus be placed beyond doubt for future opera-
tions. Secondly, the participation of German military 
personnel in the NATO-owned Reconnaissance and 
Command capability should be guaranteed by law, 
without reference to individual cases, and thus be 
separated from parliamentary involvement in the 
authorisation of individual troop deployments. The 
right of the Bundestag to revoke its approval of a 
deployment of armed forces would remain unaffected. 
One could ask whether these strictly limited excep-
tions might soon have to be followed by others, per-
haps resulting in a gradual undermining of the par-
liamentary approval process. Even at a time when 
budgets are tight, Europe must keep modern military 
capabilities available. Most European countries will 
only be able to do this in future by means of increased 
multilateral cooperation and the development of joint 
projects. The current catchwords are Smart Defence 
and Pooling and Sharing. The assured availability of 
capabilities crucial to operations is an important 
requirement in this context. In spite of this, the 
danger of a gradual erosion of Parliament’s rights is 
remote. As far as security cooperation is concerned, 
the larger European nations cling to state sovereignty, 
and show little interest in transferring their powers 
to multilateral structures. 
The proposed amendment of the Parliamentary 
Participation Act advocated here points to a broader, 
highly political discussion about Germany’s inter-
national role, a discussion that is ongoing. In this 
context, a more Alliance-friendly interpretation of 
the democratic principle of the ‘parliamentary army’ 
would be a pragmatic partial response to current 
and future security policy challenges. It would show 
Germany’s continued willingness to contribute its 
share to the management of international crises 
alongside its closest NATO and EU partners. 
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The Legal Position and Alliance Practice 
 
The constitutive role of the Bundestag in authorising 
the deployment of the Bundeswehr abroad is firmly 
anchored, both legally and politically, in German 
security policy thinking. The legal situation, the con-
victions of the political elite and the general level of 
public acceptance leave no room for doubt in that 
regard. Germany’s historical and political commit-
ment to providing for its security in a multilateral 
framework, specifically within the United Nations, 
NATO and the EU, is equally clear. When acting in an 
Alliance context, Germany always faces the political 
challenge of remaining aware both of the issue of 
democratic legitimacy at home as well as the legiti-
mate expectations of its partners abroad. 
Parliamentary authority and Alliance 
solidarity in the judgements of the Federal 
Constitutional Court and the Parliamentary 
Participation Act 
The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) makes no refer-
ence to the deployment of German armed forces 
abroad, with the exception of the prohibition on 
planning a war of aggression contained in Article 26 
paragraph 1. It is, rather, the Federal Constitutional 
Court that has defined the parameters that currently 
determine legal practice, through its interpretation 
of the constitution, particularly in the two landmark 
decisions of 1994 and 2008.1
According to the rulings of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, German armed forces are regarded as 
 In keeping with this, the 
deployment of German armed forces abroad requires, 
as a matter of principle, the prior constitutive consent 
of the Bundestag. As a ‘parliamentary army’, the Bun-
deswehr is embedded within the democratic constitu-
tional order and the rule of law. The requirement of 
parliamentary approval flows directly from the con-
stitution and cannot be infringed by subsidiary legis-
lation; the ambit of this provision is to be interpreted 
in favour of Parliament. 
 
1  Decision of 12 July 1994, Federal Constitutional Court, 90: 
pp. 286ff and decision of 7th May 2008, Federal Constitution-
al Court, 121: pp. 135ff. 
being on operations (im Einsatz) when the specific 
circumstances of the case warrant the assumption of 
a real expectation that they will become involved in 
armed operations. In its ruling of 2008, the Court 
expands on the participation of German military per-
sonnel on board air-based NATO reconnaissance air-
craft (AWACS) as follows: ‘In the course of an armed 
operation, for example, those who supply important 
information for the use of arms, who carry out recon-
naissance that immediately directs the armed oper-
ation, or who are even entitled, as part of their mili-
tary function, to give orders for the use of arms, are 
involved in armed operations, without it being neces-
sary for them to carry arms themselves.’2
The possibility of a transfer of sovereignty is explic-
itly endorsed in the Preamble to the Basic Law. The 
Federal Republic is authorised by Article 24 paragraph 
2 of the Basic Law to enter into a system of mutual 
collective security and to consent to limitations upon 
its sovereign powers that this would entail. There are 
few indications of the details that the Federal Consti-
tutional Court envisages as defining the obligations of 
membership of an alliance. The Court clarified, how-
ever: ‘The constitutional requirement of parliamen-
tary consent to specific deployments of troops must 
not impair the Federal Republic’s ability to defend 
itself nor its ability to meet its obligations as a mem-
ber of an alliance.’
 
3 The Court therefore concedes to 
the Federal Government the right to authorise the 
immediate deployment of armed forces in situations 
of ‘imminent danger’ (Gefahr im Verzug). Parliamentary 
approval must be secured retrospectively. Further-
more, in regard to the membership of an alliance, it 
provided that ‘the level of parliamentary participation 
could be scaled back’ where the circumstances of 
deployment are already delineated in a treaty-based 
programme of military integration.4
The Parliamentary Participation Act enacted by 
the Bundestag in 2005 follows directly from the 1994 
ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, which had 
expressed an expectation that the legislature would 
 
 
2  BVerfGE 121: pp. 135ff, <81>. 
3  BVerfGE 90: pp. 286ff, <344>. 
4  Ibid., <347>. 
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regulate ‘the details and extent of parliamentary par-
ticipation.’5
The reasoning for the Act put forward as part of the 
draft law by the ruling Social Democratic and Bünd-
nis 90/The Greens parliamentary parties on 24 March 
2004, sheds a particularly interesting light on the 
obligations of membership of an alliance. It states that 
‘in accordance with previous practice, the participa-
tion of German military personnel in permanent inte-
grated and multilateral staffs and headquarters of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and other 
organisations of collective security (…) shall not be 
regarded as a deployment (Einsatz) of armed forces in 
accordance with this law.’
 
6 This wording gives explicit 
meaning to the concept of alliance obligations. The 
principle is subsequently qualified, stating that: ‘par-
ticipation in staffs and headquarters of NATO and 
other collective security organisations that are spe-
cially formed for a specific armed operation requires 
the constitutive consent of the German Bundestag.’7
Germany and Alliance obligations: 
areas of concern 
 
Whereas the concept of the ‘parliamentary army’ is 
largely defined by German law, the notion of alliance 
obligations must be explained primarily in political 
terms. A closer look at some examples will provide 
points of reference about the interaction of national 
political and legal parameters with Germany’s role in 
the multilateral decision-making process. The prac-
tical experience gathered within NATO as a politico-
military alliance gives a better indication than is the 
case with the EU, where the focus is on political and 
civil crisis management. 
Alliance obligations are not restricted to operations 
of collective self-defence under Article 5 of the NATO 
treaty. In fact, the current political focus is on the 
management of crises outside the treaty area. Against 
this backdrop, alliance solidarity does not necessarily 
entail the participation of the national forces of mem-
ber states in each and every operation.8
 
5  Ibid. 
 No member 
6  German Bundestag, Printed paper 15/2742 of 23 March 
2004, p. 4. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Markus Kaim argues that Germany is subject to the ‘para-
digm of collective action’ in security policy to such a great 
extent that it has no other option than to contribute forces 
to any NATO-led operation. See Markus Kaim, ‘Deutsche 
state of NATO or the EU wishes to relinquish control 
over decisions about national military contributions 
into the hands of these alliances. The German Parlia-
mentary Participation Act is another expression of 
these reservations about the transfer of sovereignty. In 
an Alliance made up of 28 states, there will always be 
situations in which, for political or practical reasons, 
not every member is able to participate fully in mili-
tary operations. In this regard, a certain measure of 
flexibility is crucial in preserving the Alliance’s co-
hesion and ability to act. While, generally speaking, 
all member states are engaged in Afghanistan, this is 
no longer the case for the second largest NATO-led 
operation, in Kosovo. Less than half the NATO member 
states participated with their own military forces in 
‘Operation Unified Protector’ in Libya. Even the lead-
ing nation within the Alliance opted to ‘lead from 
behind.’ 
On the other hand, the basis of a viable defence 
alliance is shared risk and trust in the mutual soli-
darity of its members. A successful demonstration 
of solidarity builds respect and influence within the 
organisation and ensures the protection and support 
of the Allies when needed. The demonstration of 
Alliance solidarity will certainly require a contribu-
tion to the most important NATO-led operations, con-
sistent with a country’s role and capabilities. When 
decisions are taken at the national level, a NATO 
member state should take into account the extent to 
which its allies may be dependent on the capabilities 
that it provides. Germany, for example, has at its dis-
posal specialised capabilities in the area of protection 
against chemical agents and in the electronic sup-
pression of hostile air defence, both of which play an 
important role in the NATO framework. The joint 
participation of all member states in the Integrated 
Command Structure and in the Alliance owned and 
operated Air-based Reconnaissance Capability is par-
ticularly important in forging Alliance solidarity. 
In the NATO Council, decisions are arrived at by 
consensus. The efficient performance of the mecha-
nisms that build consensus is of vital importance to 
the functioning of the Alliance. In Council, member 
states are represented by their governments and enter 
 
Einsätze in der Multilateralismusfalle?’, in: Auslandseinsätze der 
Bundeswehr. Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielräume und Lehren, ed. 
Stefan Mair, SWP-Studie 27/2007 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, September 2007), pp. 43ff. In the context 
of an enlarged NATO, intensified partner relations and recent 
operational experience, this no longer appears as compelling 
for Germany or for other member states. 
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into negotiations with one another on a special basis 
of trust. This is only possible when each government is 
able to act with a sufficient measure of autonomy, and 
thus is another factor that enables countries to meet 
their Alliance obligations. 
Participation in NATO’s Integrated 
Command Structure 
The command of a NATO operation is vested in the 
permanent Integrated Command Structure. All NATO 
member states participating in military integration 
hold posts in the headquarters of the Command Struc-
ture. Since it became a member of NATO in 1955, Ger-
many has also appointed personnel to serve in the 
Integrated Command Structure. In accordance with 
the agreed quota, around 15% of the peacetime 
establishment of just under 7,000 posts are currently 
held by German military personnel. 
The permanent Integrated Command Structure 
is NATO’s backbone. It provides a specific capability, 
a unique reservoir of reconnaissance, planning and 
command capacities that are permanently available 
and are essential for political decision-making and 
control within the Alliance. One aspect of the reform 
of the Integrated Command Structure decided on at 
the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010 is a transition 
towards the greater flexibility of these structures.9
In the context of the reform currently being im-
plemented, it is a moot point whether the scenario of 
a flexible and mobile Integrated Command Structure 
would still fall within an interpretation of the German 
Parliamentary Participation Act, under which the 
participation of armed personnel in ‘permanent inte-
grated staffs and headquarters’ is not regarded as a 
deployment and thus not subject to the consent of the 
Bundestag. Or would this cross the boundary where 
‘staffs and headquarters are specially formed for a 
specific armed operation’? 
 
This would mean, for example, organising a number 
of the existing headquarters so that some of their 
components, the mobile Battle Staffs, could be de-
ployed to theatre, should the need arise. 
This is by no means an academic question. It played 
a role in connection with ‘Operation Unified Protec-
tor’ in Libya, and could potentially bring Germany to 
the point of withdrawal from the Integrated Com-
 
9  Cf. para. 49, NATO Summit Declaration of 20 November 
2010. 
mand Structure in a future NATO operation. A for-
ward-looking policy towards the Alliance should 
already be anticipating the transition of the NATO 
Command Structure today. 
The decision to launch a NATO operation can only 
be taken with the agreement of all member states. 
After this, the Integrated Command Structure stands 
ready to assume command of the operation. No mem-
ber state has ever questioned this automatic Alliance 
mechanism and there is no case in which personnel 
from any nation have deliberately been withdrawn 
from the integrated staff with a view to their partici-
pation in a particular operation.10
Participation in Joint Reconnaissance and 
Command Capabilities 
 
Since the late 1970’s, NATO has owned the Airborne 
Early Warning and Control System AWACS. The 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has 
operational command (OPCOM) over the system. The 
participating nations have delegated considerable 
authority to him, including the potential redeploy-
ment of the aircraft. In the case of deployment out-
side the NATO treaty area, this would need the con-
sent of the North Atlantic Council. 
The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control 
Fleet currently is made up of two operational com-
mands. The NATO Command consists of 17 AWACS 
Boeing-707 aircraft and has been stationed in Geilen-
kirchen since 1982. A UK Command of 7 aircraft, 
crewed exclusively by UK personnel, operates out of 
Waddington. (GBR) The NATO unit is commanded 
by a German general, and the military personnel are 
provided by 15 nations. Germany holds around one 
third of these posts. This means, in fact, that opera-
tions of the NATO Command cannot be sustained 
without the participation of its German personnel. 
At the Chicago Summit in April 2012, NATO also 
decided to procure the Global Hawk system, i.e. drones 
for airborne ground surveillance. (Alliance Ground 
Surveillance, AGS). As with AWACS, this new NATO 
capability will be stationed under the command of 
SACEUR. It will be deployed in Sigonella (ITA) from 
2016. Germany provides about 30% of the procure-
ment costs. This makes it one of the two biggest con- 
 
10  France’s withdrawal from NATO’s military integration in 
1967 is not such a case, but was rather a fundamental politi-
cal decision. It was reversed in 2009. 
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Parliamentary participation and the deployment of troops abroad:  
the legal basis and political practice in member countries of NATO and the EU 
 In 18 of 33 NATO and EU member states, Parlia-
ment participates in the deployment of armed 
forces on the basis of a provision of the constitu-
tion or a statute. In a further seven states, parlia-
mentary participation is political usage despite 
the absence of a national legal requirement. This 
effectively means that, in the overwhelming 
majority of NATO and EU member states, the 
views of Parliament are taken into account when 
sending armed forces abroad. 
 A closer look reveals considerable differences in 
terms of the level of detail and binding nature of 
parliamentary participation. Two states, Luxem-
burg and Spain, have more stringent rules than 
in Germany. Turkey and nine other smaller states 
have provisions that are comparable to those in 
Germany. In France, authorisation by Parliament 
only takes place retroactively and only for deploy-
ments of longer than four months duration. 
 It is instructive to compare the four nations in 
the small group that, in view of their military 
capabilities, generally determine NATO’s specific 
operational planning. Germany is the only part-
ner in this group where far-reaching parliamen-
tary participation is mandatory. The current dis-
cussion about a possible military reaction to the 
use of chemical agents in Syria nevertheless  
  reveals a trend in the UK, the US and even in 
France towards strengthening parliamentary 
participation. In the US, the President, in his role 
as Commander-in-Chief, decides on the deploy-
ment of armed forces, irrespective of the unre-
solved constitutional conflict on this point. In the 
United Kingdom, the right to deploy is regarded 
as the sole privilege of the government (Crown 
Prerogative), despite the fact that, since the Iraq 
intervention in 2003, the common-law case for a 
parliamentary debate preceding a decision has 
become more compelling. In view of the weaker 
voice of the French Parliament, the decision to 
deploy effectively rests with the President alone. 
 With a view to fulfilling Alliance obligations, the 
issue of how individual states treat the military 
personnel assigned to integrated NATO and EU 
staffs and commands is of particular importance. 
In all other countries except Germany, even in-
cluding countries such as Spain, Denmark and 
Turkey, where deployment is otherwise governed 
by similarly stringent regulations, participation 
of these military personnel in NATO or EU-led 
operations is not dependent upon separate par-
liamentary authorisation. It is accepted pragmati-
cally as a logical consequence and integral part 
of membership of these organisations. 
 
tributors – by far – to the project, together with the 
US. 
Neither the NATO Command in Geilenkirchen nor 
in Sigonella form part of the NATO Command Struc-
ture but both are closely linked to it as capabilities of 
strategic importance. It is beyond doubt that, without 
this resource, neither the Command Structure nor 
NATO as a whole could deploy their specific capabili-
ties for the preparation and command of an operation 
during a crisis. Under today’s circumstances, Alliance 
owned Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnais-
sance (Joint ISR) plays a crucial role in the success of 
each operation. This was borne out impressively by 
‘Operation Unified Protector’ in Libya. 
Germany’s participation in NATO’s Airborne Recon-
naissance capability has, on a number of occasions, 
presented it with a difficult dilemma. The last such 
case arose in connection with the renewal of the Af-
ghanistan mandate in January 2011. The maximum 
number of German military personnel included under 
this national mandate did not provide for participa-
tion in AWACS, despite the existence of NATO plans 
for their use over Afghanistan. At a time when the 
draw-down of the international troop presence in 
Afghanistan was beginning, the German government 
did not wish to send what would have been, in its 
view, the wrong political signal, by increasing its mili-
tary contingent. As a result, the AWACS deployment 
began in January 2011 without German participation. 
NATO staffs began to investigate how long this oper-
ation could be sustained under these conditions. 
The Libya crisis finally led to an unexpected turn 
of events. Following Germany’s abstention in the UN 
Security Council vote on the Libya resolution, it gave 
a green light in the NATO Council on 22 March 2011, 
only a few days later, for a NATO-led operation in 
Libya. In common with a number of other member 
states, Germany did not participate with national 
Germany and Alliance obligations: areas of concern 
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means, yet German military personnel were the only 
contingent to be withdrawn from the AWACS aircraft 
deployed in the course of the Libya operation. At the 
same time, however, on 25 March 2011, the Bundestag 
approved a government request for a separate man-
date covering AWACS deployment over Afghanistan – 
although circumstances there had not changed. This 
gesture of solidarity brought practical and political 
redress for the military non-participation and the opt-
out of AWACS over Libya. Nevertheless, the incident 
left mixed feelings within the Alliance. 
The German position considered: 
analysis and evaluation 
In spite of the outspoken criticism of its non-partici-
pation in the NATO operation in Libya, Germany 
continues to be sought after as a partner. It provides 
important capabilities and resources and makes a 
substantial contribution to almost every Alliance 
operation, and is likely to continue to do in future. 
The stationing of German Patriot units in Turkey at 
the beginning of 2013 confirms this assessment. 
Equally, the allies appreciate Germany’s willingness to 
demonstrate solidarity during NATO-led operations. 
Even in cases where it does not take part in military 
operations itself, it seeks to relieve the burden on its 
allies with practical measures and gestures. Germany 
has the reputation of being sceptical towards the use 
of military means in crisis situations. It is not alone 
in this view, either within the Alliance or in the EU. 
Due to its considerable military and political weight, 
however, it often finds itself at the focus of attention. 
The participation in integrated military structures 
during operations proves to be a neuralgic point in 
Germany’s commitment to the Alliance. From the 
allies’ point of view, this should be a matter of course. 
The prevailing legal situation in Germany, as laid 
down by the decisions of the Federal Constitutional 
Court, extends its reach to the deployment of German 
military personnel in joint Alliance staffs and head-
quarters and thus has a direct impact on Alliance 
concerns. The application of this proviso sends Ger-
many down a political Sonderweg. On more than one 
occasion, it has already led Germany to pull out of 
the Alliance owned and operated capability for Air-
borne Reconnaissance (AWACS). There are reasons to 
suppose that Germany is limited by the strictures of 
its constitution as far as the agreed transition towards 
greater flexibility of the Integrated Command Struc-
ture is concerned. This could, in turn, raise the threat 
of a partial withdrawal from operations. 
It would be incorrect to hold the principle of parlia-
mentary participation responsible for this situation. 
Many member states of NATO and the EU observe 
parliamentary participation and yet only Germany is 
confronted with the problems outlined above. The 
distinguishing features are a combination of specific 
legal provisions, political experience and misgivings, 
and the prevailing domestic political situation at a 
given moment. The deployment of troops abroad is a 
topic that bears considerable potential for conflict 
in the public arena as well as in Parliament. Every 
government suspects that the opposition will not let 
slip an opportunity of scoring points at the admini-
stration’s expense during a parliamentary debate of 
the issue. Legal counsel in the ministries worry that 
every new government application for a deployment 
might trigger another round of legal conflict before 
the Federal Constitutional Court, with unpredictable 
consequences that might complicate the matter fur-
ther. Within the administration, domestic political 
tactics carry the day over foreign policy strategies; to 
international observers, the German position appears 
hamstrung and inward looking. 
Addressing Areas of Concern in the Parliamentary Participation Act: Proposed Amendments 
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Addressing Areas of Concern in the Parliamentary Participation 
Act: Proposed Amendments 
 
Members of Parliament who are engaged in foreign 
and defence policy as well as the Ministries concerned 
are aware of Germany’s difficulties with its Alliance 
obligations, as described above.11
It is often suggested that parliament and the gov-
ernment should become engaged in a closer dialogue 
on security policy matters: more active steps are re-
quired to forge a consensus within society on the role 
to be played by the armed forces and as to Germany’s 
international political responsibility. A number of 
people see this as the real problem. Intensified dia-
logue and a broader consensus, they say, could im-
prove the application of the Parliamentary Participa-
tion Act and thereby strengthen Germany’s solidarity 
towards its allies. One proposal in this context is the 
idea of an annual general debate on security policy, 
which would shift the focus beyond individual opera-
tions towards the strategic challenges currently faced 
by German security policy. Although an intensified 
security policy discussion is certainly to be welcomed, 
it cannot be expected that this alone will provide 
Germany with a solution to the problem of its special 
situation within the Alliance. To achieve a solution, 
besides efforts to shape attitudes on security policy, a 
number of specific regulations would be required. 
 A number of consid-
erations are put forward in political circles although a 
clear concept of the way forward is not yet apparent. 
There are also proposals for the incorporation of 
the principle of parliamentary participation into the 
constitution.12
 
11  The author has raised these issues with a number of MPs 
from the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and 
with the German Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. 
 This could be seen as a positive step, 
in that the legislature, whose mandate is legislative 
action, would snatch back the initiative, and the risk 
of running foul of the Constitutional Court, a risk that 
any change to the Parliamentary Participation Act 
must run, would be significantly reduced. At the same 
12  See e.g. Dieter Wiefelspütz, ‘Der wehrverfassungsrecht-
liche Parlamentsvorbehalt’, Humboldt Forum Recht, no. 16 
(2010): pp. 230–249. He proposes that the principle of parlia-
mentary participation should be embedded explicitly within 
the constitution. This would avoid relying solely on the ‘bold’ 
interpretation of the consitution by the Federal Constitution-
al Court. 
time, the necessary two-thirds majority in both houses 
required for a change to the constitution presents a 
difficult political obstacle. The project of changing the 
constitution would certainly create an impression that 
fundamental concepts are to be changed or new pro-
visions added. At any rate, now that the question of 
deployment abroad has been dealt with comprehen-
sively in the Parliamentary Participation Act, there is 
no longer any need to change the constitution. 
Finally, a limited revision of the Act could provide 
an opportunity for allowing the Bundestag and the 
government to agree on setting out useful clarifica-
tions and definitions in the light of experience within 
the Alliance in recent years.13
In the following paragraphs, two possible amend-
ments to the Parliamentary Participation Act are pro-
posed and discussed. 
 This would strengthen 
Germany’s role in NATO and the EU without weaken-
ing the democratic legitimacy of decisions on deploy-
ment. If the Bundestag were to decide to modify its 
own rights of participation by a change in the law, 
this would also provide a point of reference for the 
Federal Constitutional Court. 
Regarding NATO’s flexible Integrated 
Command Structure 
‘The participation of military personnel of the Bundes-
wehr in permanent multinational staffs and head-
quarters of NATO and other organisations of collective 
security in Alliance-led operations shall not constitute 
 
13  This proposal is also put forward, for example, by Andreas 
Schockenhoff and Roderich Kiesewetter: ‘Impulse für Europas 
Sicherheitspolitik. Die Zeit zum Handeln ist gekommen’, in: 
Internationale Politik 67 no. 5 (September–October, 2012): pp. 
88–97 (96). The authors favour a ‘pre-emptive decision’ by 
the Bundestag, that is, an annual decision authorising, in 
principle, the deployment of German armed forces and 
capabilities within multilaterally integrated crisis reaction 
forces. This appears problematic. Moreover, Schockenhoff 
and Kiesewetter do not draw a clear distinction between the 
participation of German personnel in integrated Alliance 
staffs and commands on the one hand and the deployment of 
German armed forces in the framework of the NATO Re-
sponse Force or the EU Battle Group on the other. 
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“deployment” (Einsatz) of German armed forces for the 
purposes of this Act.’ 
This wording is derived from the reasoning of the 
draft Parliamentary Participation Act in 2004. It 
adopts current practice and the intention of the 
legislature at the time to exempt German personnel 
in permanent staffs and headquarters of the Alliance 
from the requirement of parliamentary authorisation. 
If this passage were added, an important aspect of the 
obligations engendered by membership of an alliance 
would be fixed within the text of the law itself. 
The proposed provision is clear. The wording refers 
only to the participation of German armed forces in 
permanent staffs. In the case of NATO, this refers, at 
present, to the peacetime establishment of almost 
7000 military and civilian posts in headquarters of 
the NATO Command Structure. 
The wording takes account of the transition of the 
NATO Command Structure towards greater flexibility, 
as described above, including the possibility of de-
ploying parts of the Command Structure into theatre 
outside Alliance territory. ‘Permanent’ does not nec-
essarily mean static. It includes the possibility of the 
flexible adaptation of structures with a view to a 
specific operation, though this is strictly limited to 
the permanent posts of the peacetime establishment 
of headquarters of the Integrated Command Structure. 
If the Command Structure needs to be reinforced 
beyond the peacetime establishment for a specific 
operation, this is done through a ‘force generation 
process’ in which member states provide additional 
personnel. Personnel of this category, possibly drawn 
from the headquarters of national armed forces, 
would definitely not be covered by the proposed 
amendment of the Act. Any deployment of these 
national capabilities would remain a sovereign deci-
sion by each member state, and in Germany would 
thus depend on authorisation by the Bundestag. 
Regarding Alliance owned and operated 
Reconnaissance and Command Capabilities 
‘The operative command over NATO Airborne Recon-
naissance and Command units has been transferred to 
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. (SACEUR) 
Service by German military personnel in these units 
constitutes an important contribution by Germany 
towards the intended functioning of the NATO Inte-
grated Command Structure. Parliamentary authorisa-
tion of deployment according to Section 1(2) of the 
Act shall be deemed to be granted for service in these 
units. The military personnel serving in these units 
shall not be included in the maximum number of 
personnel in operations under Section 3(2) of this Act. 
The right of revocation of the Bundestag according to 
Section 8 of the Act remains unaffected.’ 
This draft text breaks new ground. It takes as its start-
ing point the conclusion reached by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court, that the participation of German 
military personnel in NATO’s Airborne Reconnais-
sance and Command capability should, in certain 
circumstances, be regarded as deployment and, on 
that basis, the proposed amendment clarifies that 
the Bundestag gives its consent to every deployment 
of this kind (gilt als erteilt: ‘is deemed to be granted’). 
It justifies this exception by reference to two points. 
Firstly, by pointing out the crucial importance of Air-
borne Reconnaissance and Command for the proper 
functioning of NATO’s Integrated Command Struc-
ture. Secondly, by referring to the corresponding 
transfer of operational command over this particular 
capability to an organ of the Alliance. Germany’s 
membership of the Alliance requires that its military 
personnel on service in these specialised units are 
available during a crisis as a matter of course, just as 
they are when serving in permanent Alliance staffs. 
The right of revocation ensures that the Bundestag 
retains the final right of decision even in this excep-
tional case. 
The proposed amendment could be played through 
for the actual examples of NATO-led operations in Af-
ghanistan and Libya. In the first case, it seems unlikely 
that the question of participation by German military 
personnel in AWACS missions over Afghanistan would 
have become the subject of a separate political debate 
in Germany. The ISAF mandate, which has been in 
place for many years, including the stipulation of a 
maximum number of military personnel in theatre, 
would have remained unaffected by the AWACS ques-
tion. The participation of German military personnel 
on board NATO’s AWACS aircraft over Afghanistan 
would have been an obvious consequence of the Ger-
man decision to give political support to the NATO-led 
operation. In retrospect, this seems fitting. 
In the second case, as a result of Germany’s accep-
tance in Council of the NATO-led ‘Operation Unified 
Protector’ in Libya, its military personnel would have 
been employed on board AWACS aircraft in the frame-
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work of NATO’s Airborne Reconnaissance and Com-
mand unit. Again, this appears consistent. The Ger-
man government, despite its abstention in the UN 
Security Council vote and the decision not to provide 
national contingents or weapons systems for the op-
eration, did not wish to hamper NATO as an organisa-
tion from intervening in Libya. The Bundestag would 
have had the option of recalling German military 
personnel from the AWACS aircraft. It would certainly 
have been a difficult decision. That too seems appro-
priate, since the obvious harm such a far-reaching 
decision inflicts on the Alliance must be weighed 
carefully in each case against other considerations of 
foreign and security policy. 
Possible objections14
A number of possible objections could be made: 
 
 The Federal Government has the right of initiative, 
and could thus use its parliamentary majority to 
ensure the consent of the Bundestag to the partici-
pation of German military personnel on board 
AWACS, as soon as this is required by a decision to 
launch an Alliance operation. 
Submitting requests to the Bundestag to authorise 
the participation of individual armed personnel in 
integrated Alliance functions ahead of each decision 
to launch an operation would only drive Germany 
further down its Sonderweg. Even in cases where Ger-
many is not involved in an operation with its own 
military forces, this would create the need for addi-
tional consultation with Parliament. Relations with 
the allies would suffer, as the integrity of the con-
sensus-building process within the Alliance would 
be jeopardised. The essential prerequisite for this 
process is a sufficiently broad measure of autonomy 
on the part of the executive.15
 
14  The focus is on a number of relevant objections. Funda-
mental criticism, which rejects Germany’s NATO member-
ship out of hand, or denies any possible justification for 
military intervention, will not be considered. A good survey 
of the wide spectrum of opinions, appears in the ‘Forum zum 
Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz’, Sicherheit und Frieden 30, no. 4 
(2012): pp. 230ff, with contributions from Johannes Varwick; 
Klaus Naumann, Dieter Deiseroth, Reinhard Mutz and Peter 
Strutynski. 
 
15  The scholarly debate points towards the recent tendency 
in decisions by the Federal Costitutional Court, which 
anchors parliamentary participation to the principle of 
democracy and has, overall, strengthened the position of 
the legislature in the field of foreign affairs. This tendency, 
 The deployment of some elements of the NATO 
Command Structure to a crisis zone or the use of 
airborne NATO reconnaissance forces carries the 
risk of NATO becoming gradually entangled in 
armed conflict. The proposed exceptions to the rule 
of parliamentary participation would therefore 
breach the constitution by limiting the constitutive 
requirement of parliamentary consent. 
Decisions by NATO or the EU can have considerable 
impact on German security. This can apply to the 
decision to launch an operation led by NATO or the 
EU, but equally, for example, to the public pronounce-
ments of these organisations during critical situa-
tions, or to the deployment of a NATO-led naval unit. 
Neither for Germany nor for its Allies does this imply 
that decision-taking is transferred from the Alliance 
into the parliaments of member states. It is a core task 
of every German government to promote Germany’s 
security interests within international organisations 
in a responsible manner. In doing so, it should make 
proper allowance for any special risks. The govern-
ment is responsible for withholding its consent in 
individual cases and thereby preventing recourse to 
NATO or the EU for a particular operation. Events in 
Iraq in 2003 demonstrate that this is not a purely 
theoretical option. 
Article 24 paragraph 2 of the Basic Law (Grund-
gesetz) paves the way for Germany’s entry into a 
system of collective security. In its landmark decision 
of 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court bore this 
in mind when providing for the possibility of scaling 
back parliamentary participation in response to 
Alliance obligations.16
 
however, is specifically limited by the objective needs arising 
from Germany’s wish to participate in international organi-
sations and decision-making processes. The discussion among 
constitutional lawyers is on-going. Cf. Andreas L. Paulus/ 
Henrik Jacobs: ‘Neuere Entwicklungen bei der Parlaments-
beteiligung für den Auslandseinsatz der Bundeswehr’ in: Die 
Friedens-Warte 87, no. 2–3 (2012): pp. 23–68. 
 The Federal Constitutional 
Court’s allusion here ‘must not be (mis)understood to 
mean that (scaling back parliamentary participation) 
allows the principle of prior constitutive consent by 
the Bundestag to each specific deployment to be aban-
doned without compelling reasons. A general authori-
sation allowing the Federal Government to deploy 
such (a multilateral unit within an organisation of 
collective security) should be permissible under the 
constitution in narrowly defined circumstances, on 
condition that the right of revocation can be exercised 
16  For details, cf. p. 7 above. 
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at any time’.17 This was the opinion of Hans Klein, a 
former judge at the Constitutional Court, in a legal 
opinion given to the Bundestag Committee on the 
Rules of Procedure during a committee session on the 
Parliamentary Participation Act. Dieter Wiefelspütz, 
a Member of Parliament, a lawyer and one of the spir-
itual fathers of the Act, confirms this interpretation: 
‘The participation of the Bundestag can (…) be scaled 
back if this seems appropriate in view of military inte-
gration governed by treaty obligations. This would, 
however, require the express consent of the German 
Bundestag, which would have to waive (in part) its 
right of participation in this respect.’18
The proposed amendments take up these ideas. 
They adapt and shape the details and scope of parlia-
mentary participation in a marginal area so as to 
maintain Germany’s ability to act, and its reliability 
within the Alliance, at a time of changing circum-
stances. 
 
 These two very limited changes in the law will not 
work wonders. The crucial points affecting German 
obligations towards its allies are its deep-rooted 
aversion to any use of military force and its lack of 
ambition for assuming a role on the stage of world 
politics consistent with its position. 
This study deliberately follows a pragmatic ap-
proach. It proposes steps that are limited but politi-
cally feasible, and would ease Germany’s burden both 
within the Alliance and, perhaps, in the context of 
domestic politics too. Even a small step can be politi-
cally significant, provided it points the way ahead: 
a considered decision that Germany will carry on 
playing a committed and responsible role in NATO 
and the EU. What specific decisions might this lead to 
in the Alliance context in a time of crisis? The answer 
is left open. The debate about the level of responsibil-
ity Germany might be willing to shoulder in main-
taining order beyond its borders, or what form this 
responsibility might take, is not central to this study. 
There are, nevertheless, cross-references to the concept 
of the ‘parliamentary army’, points that will be re-
ferred to again below. 
 Even if a majority of the Bundestag were convinced 
by the arguments for a limited reform of parliamen-
tary participation, one important issue remains: the 
forces of globalisation and multilateral cooperation 
 
17  Deutscher Bundestag, 15. Wahlperiode, Stenografisches 
Protokoll der 25. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Wahlprüfung, Immunität 
und Geschäftsordnung vom 17. Juni 2004, pp. 100ff. 
18  Dieter Wiefelspütz, ‘Hände weg vom Parlamentsheer!’, Die 
Friedens-Warte 87, no. 2–3 (2012): pp. 16–21 (20). 
present parliamentary assemblies with an increas-
ing challenge to their role, especially in the areas of 
foreign and European policy. Seen from that angle, 
might the concepts of Smart Defence and Pooling and 
Sharing threaten to undermine the rights of the 
Bundestag to authorise each deployment of German 
armed forces abroad? If this were so, the narrowly 
circumscribed amendments to the Parliamentary 
Participation Act proposed here could turn out to 
be the first steps on a slippery slope, and ought to 
be rejected for that reason. 
The following chapter will endeavour to demon-
strate that, even in the long term, the consequences of 
the amendments to the law will remain as narrowly 
circumscribed as intended, and will give reasons why 
this is the case. 
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Smart Defence and Availability for Military Operations 
 
European countries must maintain adequate modern 
military capabilities if they are to retain their ability 
to participate in all aspects of international crisis 
management. Only thus will they remain a sufficient-
ly attractive partner, in military and political terms, 
for the United States of America as it increasingly 
turns its attention to other regions of the world. Like-
wise, the prevailing economic difficulties mean that 
defence expenditure is coming under close scrutiny 
on all sides. Defence budgets in many EU and NATO 
member states are shrinking or, at best, stagnating. 
The smaller Alliance partners, in particular, will be 
able to participate in the sophisticated capabilities 
essential for conducting future operations only if they 
do so through multilateral cooperation projects. In 
future, even the larger states such as France, Germany 
and the UK will no longer have at their disposal the 
full range of capabilities necessary for complex opera-
tions, and will thus be dependent on the support of 
their partners. 
NATO refers to various answers given in response to 
this challenge with the collective term Smart Defence. 
On the one hand, this implies the hope that by dealing 
with larger volumes, and with joint training and joint 
operation, essential and expensive capabilities could 
be maintained, developed and procured, while cutting 
costs at the same time. On the other hand, there is a 
view that not every state in Europe need cover the 
full spectrum of military capabilities, which would 
point to the prospect of specialisation. Pooling and 
Sharing, the terms commonly used in the EU, throw 
the differences between these two fundamentally 
different approaches into clearer relief and these 
terms will be adopted below. 
Every model of the multilateral generation of mili-
tary capabilities raises the problem of assured avail-
ability. Who decides whether the German transport 
plane assigned to the European Air Transport Com-
mand can be deployed to Mali and under what ca-
veats? Is it the commander of the unit, the German 
Bundestag or even the French President? Should 
national sovereignty be subject to a general limitation 
when deciding on the deployment of multinational 
military capabilities, so as to enable these new points 
of departure to prove successful in practice? 
Pooling 
The question of transfer of sovereignty is not relevant 
to the pooling of capabilities. Typically under this ap-
proach, the capabilities of several nations are consoli-
dated in a pool for common, optimised, use and ad-
ministration. The capabilities provided by each nation 
remain under national command. The initial potential 
advantage for all participants is the flexible – though 
not necessarily reliable – access to capabilities far 
beyond what they have contributed themselves. 
Furthermore, military advantages can accrue, for 
example, through increased interoperability or 
potential financial savings through astute manage-
ment of the pool. 
One such example is provided by the European Air 
Transport Command (EATC), which has already been 
mentioned. Approximately 140 tactical as well as non-
tactical air transport forces were brought together 
under a single command in Eindhoven (Netherlands). 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Luxemburg 
share in this pool. Operational Control – not Opera-
tional Command – was transferred to the commander 
of the unit. Each participating nation retains the 
command over its own aircraft. 
During the French intervention in Mali at the 
beginning of 2013, the transport command played an 
important support role. France addressed requests 
with its requirements to the EATC. The decision as to 
whether a specific request can be fulfilled by German 
aircraft is subject, however, to national control. Legal 
caveats, for example, have to be taken into considera-
tion. During the initial phase, specifically during the 
period before a mandate for deployment had been 
passed by the Bundestag, German participation was 
limited to flight configurations that were considered 
to lie below the threshold of actual military deploy-
ment. German planes were not permitted to transport 
French troops or weapons, while the transport of Afri-
can troops belonging to the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) in Africa was allowed. 
It became abundantly clear during this transitional 
phase that the pooling of capabilities certainly does 
not mean that national sovereignty is relinquished in 
favour of automatic availability. 
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These considerations also apply to the multilateral 
troop contingents created specifically with rapid 
availability in crisis in mind: the NATO Response Force 
(NRF) and the EU Battle Groups (BG) or the far-reaching 
bilateral Memorandum of Understanding of 28 May 
2013 on co-operation in defence matters between 
Germany and the Netherlands. The character of these 
units as rapid deployment forces should not obscure 
the fact that each deployment of the NATO Response 
Force in which armed forces of the Bundeswehr par-
ticipate, for example, would be contingent upon 
constitutive authorisation by the Bundestag. No prior 
transfer of sovereign decision-making powers to 
another country or to a multilateral organ has taken 
place here. 
Sharing 
Sharing refers to the binding pledge by one or several 
states to provide capabilities for joint use. This raises 
diverse questions of national sovereignty: is the state 
providing the capability really willing to limit its 
freedom of decision in favour of another state? How 
do the individual ownership rights play out against 
one another when several states join together to 
provide the capability? Can a third party really rely 
on the binding undertaking to provide capabilities 
given by other states? 
Sharing typically takes place within the framework 
and under the command of an alliance. The AWACS 
Command in Geilenkirchen, which provides the joint 
Airborne Reconnaissance and Command capability 
of the Alliance, is the most striking example. The 
planned Alliance-Ground-Surveillance-Command in 
Sigonella (ITA) would be another. Smaller Alliance 
members cannot afford modern reconnaissance air-
craft of this kind. Instead, they contribute towards 
financing the Alliance capability, in the firm expecta-
tion that they too will benefit from it. 
AWACS provides an example that highlights a 
certain nuance in the roles played by France and the 
United Kingdom. Both countries maintain their own 
AWACS units, the United Kingdom within NATO, 
France as a national capability. Both units are, in 
principle, at the disposal of the Alliance upon request. 
In the case of the French national unit, this is accord-
ing to availability at any particular moment, and 
following a decision at the national level. Germany 
has taken a different road, by contributing, at a level 
commensurate with its size, to the procurement and 
operation of capabilities jointly owned by the Alliance. 
While this high level of commitment to the Alliance 
certainly does receive recognition, the problems sur-
rounding the availability of German AWACS person-
nel have left the more powerful political impression. 
It is possible that, in future, joint capabilities such 
as satellite reconnaissance, will be developed in the 
EU context. Ideas of this kind are currently being dis-
cussed in preparation for the EU Defence Summit in 
December 2013. They raise the same questions as in 
the NATO context: who decides, according to which 
rules, on deployment? What would the chain of com-
mand look like? Finding answers to these questions 
will require much more time and further reflection. 
There are modest beginnings in the area of the 
specialisation of capabilities. These are usually dic-
tated by practical constraints. Air Policing in the Baltic 
states provides one example. Since these countries are 
not in a financial position to establish air forces of 
their own and doing so would make little sense from 
the military point of view, Alliance partners that do 
have their own air forces, including Germany, take 
turns in performing this duty for the three countries. 
Experience in both NATO and the EU shows that the 
larger European states, particularly France and the 
United Kingdom, are unwilling to put their diminish-
ing independent military capabilities under con-
straints which would limit their sovereign decisions 
about deployment.19 If it is at all possible, a small 
measure of success may be achieved bilaterally be-
tween nations with a similar political outlook. An 
initial assessment of Franco-British security and 
defence policy cooperation, which has been intensi-
fied since November 2010, gives an idea of the poten-
tial as well as the limitations of this approach.20
 
19  As far as France is concerned, the so-called Védrine Report 
is more than clear. See: Hubert Védrine, Sur les conséquences du 
retour de la France dans le commandement militare intégré de l’OTAN, 
l’avenir de la relation transatlantique et les perspectives de l’Europe de 
la défense. Paris, 14 November 2012. The UK too, has consist-
ently resisted any expansion of an integrated command 
structure in an EU framework. 
 On 
balance, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the 
traditional forces of national interests and the wish 
to preserve sovereignty stand in the way of rapid 
advances in developing joint capabilities. This holds 
true despite the considerable financial and political 
20  Ronja Kempin, Jocelyn Mawdsley and Stefan Steinicke, 
Entente Cordiale. Eine Erste Bilanz französisch-britischer Zusammen-
arbeit in der sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, DGAPanalyse 10 
(Berlin, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik [DGAP], 
August 2012). 
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pressure on the European allies. Under the proposed 
amendment to the Parliamentary Participation Act, 
the list of special capabilities for which the authorisa-
tion of the German Bundestag for the deployment of 
military personnel is to be presumed is unlikely to go 
beyond the special case of AWACS for the foreseeable 
future. From the present perspective, the joint capa-
bility of Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) is the only 
instance to which these limited criteria might also 
apply, starting in 2016. 
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The ‘Parliamentary Army’ and Political Culture in Germany: 
The Outlook 
 
The concept of the ‘parliamentary army’ ensures that 
in each instance the momentous decision to deploy 
the Bundeswehr on an armed mission abroad is care-
fully weighed up by Parliament and the public, and 
receives comprehensive democratic support. In this 
context, it is appropriate to refer to the important 
contribution that the procedure of parliamentary 
participation has made to German politics ‘in order 
to overcome, step by step, the persistent misgivings, 
even anguish, in dealing with the armed forces, with-
out trivialising the use of armed force or allowing it 
to become a matter of routine.’21
Expectations are growing, not least among NATO 
and EU partners, that Germany should accept a larger 
role in international crisis management, commensu-




This perspective lends political depth to the some-
what technical aspects of the reform of the Parliamen-
tary Participation Act. The proposed amendments deal 
specifically with corrections to regulations currently 
in force, which put Germany’s role as a partner under 
strain and impair its influence within the Alliance. At 
the same time, this limited reform would amount to 
a declaration of political solidarity and illustrate Ger-
many’s commitment to maintaining international 
order and security.
 Parallel processes in the European economic 
and monetary spheres reinforce this view. Key allies 
would like to see a substantial commitment from 
Germany and determined efforts on its part to help 
shape political outcomes, particularly in crisis 
situations. NATO and the EU provide a platform of 
Germany’s own choosing. It faces a dilemma. While 
wishing to influence policy making, it faces a number 
of expectations. Its future authority will partly depend 
on whether or not it can meet those expectations. 
23
 
21  Wiefelspütz, ‘Hände weg vom Parlamentsheer!’ (see note 
 
18), 16ff. 
22  This sentiment was expressed succinctly by the Polish 
Foreign Minister Radoslav Sikorski when he said: ‘I fear 
German power less than I am beginning to fear German 
inactivity.’ See: Poland and the Future of the European Union, 
Berlin, 28 November 2011. 
23  In the defence policy guidelines issued by the Ministry of 
Defence on 18 May 2011, ‘the fulfillment of international 
The basic direction of Germany’s post-war foreign 
policy has been aptly described as that of a ‘civil 
power’ (Zivilmacht).24
The concept of a ‘parliamentary army’ does not 
refer exclusively to democratic legitimacy in the 
domestic context. It requires, in addition, the consid-
eration of external factors, an in-depth analysis, in 
both Parliament and society, of today’s security 
challenges. Only deliberations of this kind can provide 
the political foundation for the considered judgement 
needed to underpin each decision to deploy armed 
forces. 
 Its neighbours and partners are 
aware that Germany’s response to international 
conflict is unlikely to be an instinctive call for military 
intervention. Careful consideration and the explo-
ration of non- military solutions have their place in 
international efforts at crisis diplomacy, but any real-
istic political participation cannot ignore the more 
challenging facets of the possible solutions. 
 
obligations and responsibilities’ is given as one of three goals 
of German security policy. 
24  Hanns W. Maull, ‘Deutschland als Zivilmacht’, in: Hand-
buch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, ed. Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther 
Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden, 2007): pp. 73–84. 
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Recommendations for the Parliamentary Participation Act with 
Proposed Amendments 
 
Parliament should not wait until its hand is forced 
again, by another ruling of the Federal Constitutional 
Court, or by political problems within the Alliance. 
Eight years after the Parliamentary Participation Act 
became law, sufficient evidence has been amassed for 
a pragmatic reform that would bring Germany back 
from its Sonderweg in NATO while at the same time 
reinforcing the pivotal role of the Bundestag in the 
deployment of armed forces abroad. The beginning of 
a new legislative period provides an opportunity for 
initiating the process of a strictly limited amendment 
of the Parliamentary Participation Act to this effect. 
In the text of the Act below, the proposed amend-
ments are underlined. 
Act governing Parliamentary Participation in 
Decisions on the Deployment of armed forces Abroad) 
(Parliamentary Participation Act)25
The Bundestag has adopted the following Act: 
 
Section 1: General and Common Provisions 
1. This Act regulates the form and extent of the 
Bundestag’s participation in decisions concerning 
the deployment of German armed forces abroad. 
Article 115a of the Basic Law shall remain unaffected. 
2. The deployment of German armed forces outside 
the area of application of the Basic Law shall require 
the German Bundestag’s approval. 
Section 2: Definition of Terms 
1. A deployment of armed forces shall be defined 
as the involvement, or anticipated involvement, of 
Federal Armed Forces in armed operations. 
2. Preparatory and planning measures shall not con-
stitute ‘deployment’ for the purposes of this Act. 
 
25  The English version of this text is based on an unoffical 
translation of the Act taken from a memorandum by 
Dr Katja S. Ziegler, University of Oxford, submitted to the 
Select Committee of the Constitution in the House of Lords 
of the UK Parliament on 7 December 2005. Following the 
controversial deployment of UK troops during the Iraq war, 
and in the context of considering a potential change in the 
law, evidence from Dr. Ziegler was heard about the legal 
situation then prevailing in Germany. 
Such measures shall not require the Bundestag’s 
approval. The same shall apply to the conduct, by 
the armed forces, of humanitarian relief or support 
operations in which arms are borne solely for the 
purposes of self-defence, provided that no involvement 
of the service personnel in armed operations is antici-
pated. 
3. The participation of military personnel of the 
Bundeswehr in permanent multinational staffs and 
headquarters of NATO and other organisations of 
collective security in Alliance-led operations shall not 
constitute ‘deployment’ (Einsatz) of German armed 
forces for the purposes of this Act. 
4. The operative command over NATO Airborne Recon-
naissance and Command units has been transferred to 
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. (SACEUR) 
Service by German military personnel in these units 
constitutes an important contribution by Germany 
towards the intended functioning of the NATO Inte-
grat
Section 3: Request for Deployment 
ed Command Structure. Parliamentary authorisa-
tion of deployment according to Section 1(2) of the 
Act shall be deemed to be granted for service in these 
units. The military personnel serving in these units 
shall not be included in the maximum number of 
personnel in operations under Section 3(2) of this Act. 
The right of revocation of the Bundestag according to 
Section 8 of the Act remains unaffected. 
1. The Federal Government shall forward its request 
for approval of a deployment of the armed forces to 
the Bundestag in good time, prior to the start of the 
deployment. 
2. The Federal Government’s request shall contain the 
following details in particular: 
 the operational mandate 
 the operational area 
 the legal bases for the mission 
 the maximum number of service personnel to be 
deployed 
 the capabilities of the armed forces to be deployed 
 the planned duration of the mission, and 
 the anticipated costs and funding arrangements 
3. The Bundestag may approve or reject the request. 
Amendments to the request shall not be permissible. 
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Section 4: Simplified Approval Procedure 
1. For deployments of minor scope and intensity, ap-
proval may be granted in a simplified procedure. The 
Federal Government must give reasons why the pro-
posed deployment is of minor scope and intensity. The 
President of the German Bundestag shall refer the 
request for approval to the chairpersons of the parlia-
mentary groups, the chairpersons of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee and one 
spokesperson of each parliamentary group on these 
committees, and shall arrange for the request to 
be distributed to all Members of the Bundestag as a 
printed paper. Approval shall be deemed to be granted 
unless, within seven days of the printed paper’s distri-
bution, a parliamentary group of five per cent of the 
Members of the Bundestag demand that the Bundes-
tag hold a debate. If a debate is demanded, the deci-
sion shall lie with the Bundestag. 
2. A deployment shall be deemed to be of minor scope 
and intensity if the number of service personnel de-
ployed is small, it is apparent from the accompanying 
circumstances that the deployment is of minor signifi-
cance, and it does not entail any participation in war-
fare. 
3. As a rule, deployment shall be regarded as being of 
minor scope and intensity if: 
 it involves a reconnaissance team bearing arms 
solely for the purpose of self-defence 
 it involves individual service personnel who are 
serving with allied armed forces on the basis of 
exchange agreements, or 
 it involves the deployment of individual service 
personnel within the framework of a mission led by 
the UN, NATO or the EU, or by another organisation 
in fulfilment of a UN mandate 
Section 5: Ex-post Approval 
1. Deployments in the event of imminent danger, 
which allow no scope for delay shall not require the 
Bundestag’s prior approval. The same shall apply to 
operations whose purpose is to rescue persons from 
particularly dangerous situations, provided that the 
holding of a public debate in the Bundestag would 
endanger the lives of the persons in need of rescue. 
2. The Bundestag shall be informed appropriately 
prior to and during deployment. 
3. The Bundestag’s ex-post approval for the deployment 
must be sought promptly. If the Bundestag rejects the 
request for approval, the ongoing operation must be 
terminated. 
Section 6: Obligation to Furnish Information 
1. The Federal Government shall inform the Bundestag 
regularly about the progress of the missions and about 
developments in the operational area. 
2. In cases dealt with in accordance with section 4(1) 
(Simplified Approval Procedure), the Federal govern-
ment shall report promptly to the committees respon-
sible and to the spokespersons of the parliamentary 
groups represented on these committees. 
Section 7: Extension of Deployment 
1. The procedure defined in Section 4 shall also apply 
to decisions to extend the approval of deployments in 
cases where no substantive amendments arise. 
2. If the Federal Government requests the extension of 
a deployment, approval shall be deemed to be granted 
until two days of sittings have passed following the 
distribution of the request as a Bundestag printed 
paper. If the request is dealt with in accordance with 
the simplified procedure defined in Section 4, approv-
al shall be deemed to be granted until the expiry of 
the time period defined in section 4 (1), fourth sen-
tence; if a debate in the Bundestag is demanded with-
in the time period, approval shall be deemed to be 
granted until the end of the sitting week following 
the demand for a debate. The period of validity of the 
original approval shall remain unaffected by the pro-
visions of the first and second sentences. 
Section 8: Right of Revocation 
The Bundestag may revoke its approval for a deploy-
ment of armed forces at any time. 
Section 9: Entry into Force 
This Act shall enter into force on the day after its 
promulgation. 
